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The place and role of an Observer in quantum mechanics has been a subject of an ongoing debate
since the theory’s inception. Wigner brought this question to the fore in a celebrated scenario in
which a super-Observer observes a Friend making a measurement. Here we briefly review why this
“Wigner Friend scenario” has been taken to require the introduction of the Observer’s consciousness,
or alternatively to show the inconsistency of quantum measurement theory. We will argue that
quantum theory can consistently leave observers outside its narrative, by making only minimal
assumptions about how the information about the observed results is stored in material records.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.65.AA, 03.65.UD
And I come to the fields and spacious palaces of
my memory, where are the treasures of innume-
rable images, brought into it from things of all
sorts perceived by the senses. ...What then we
have utterly forgotten, though lost, we cannot
even seek after.
St. Augustine of Hippo
Are the rules of quantum mechanics internally con-
sistent? To be consistent, the theory must give non-
controversial prescriptions for any hypothetical situation,
however difficult to realise in practice. An important
question in this discussion is the extent to which quan-
tum theory is able to deal with the role of a conscious
Observer when a measurement takes place.
Some authors have considered consciousness to be in-
strumental in accounting for the observation of a mea-
surement outcome. In their classic treatise, London and
Bauer [1] described the state of an Observer’s conscious-
ness by a vector in a Hilbert space, that gets entangled
with the system and the pointer in the pointer state basis.
This cuts the von Neumann chain [2], since conscious-
ness gives an Observer the faculty to know his own state.
Influenced by London and Bauer’s work, Wigner [3] de-
scribed a scenario in which an agent needs to ascribe a
state to another Observer undertaking a spin measure-
ment. From the point of view of this agent, a “super-
Observer”, unitary evolution would bring the Observer
to absurd state of ”suspended animation”[3]. Conscious-
ness is therefore assumed to be needed in modifying the
linear laws of quantum evolution. Recently, several au-
thors [4]-[7] used an extended Wigner’s Friend scenario
to question whether quantum mechanics rules have the
necessary internal consistency.
In his Lectures, Feynman laid out the basis rules for eval-
uating probabilities with the help of probability ampli-
tudes defined for a sum over virtual paths [8]. The ap-
proach of [8] is an agreement with Bohr [9] and von Neu-
mann [2] and leaves Observer’s consciousness and sen-
sations outside the theory’s scope. This implies that the
usual unitary evolution must be replaced by another type
of evolution - state projection or “collapse” - when a mea-
surement takes place. Otherwise the system simply gets
entangled with the different components of the pointer,
the environment etc., in a growing von Neumann chain
[2].
The purpose of this paper is to review the original
Wigner’s Friend problem [3] and, if possible, open up
a new perspective on more complex situations, such as
those considered in [4]-[7].
The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. A we re-
visit standard quantum rules, as described in Feynman’s
text book [8]. Section B describes a setup in which a
Friend(F) and Wigner (W) make their observations on
a simple two-level systems, using their respective probes.
In Sects. C to F we discuss possible choices open to F and
W. Section G briefly revisits Wigner’s original analysis
[3], and relates it to our own treatment of the problem.
Sections H and I contain the conclusions of our review,
and discuss some of their general implications.
A. CLASSICAL VS. QUANTUM RULES
Classical mechanics predicts correlations between ini-
tial and final positions of the system, q(t0) and q(t1), as
seen by an Observer [10]. In its Hamilton’s version, one
represent the system by a point, tracing a unique path
in the phase space, the latter treated as a mathemati-
cal abstraction, though reference to the physical world
is secured by the equivalent Newtonian space-time for-
mulation [11]. A system property is defined in terms of
the phase-space variables and the property value depends
on the given path irrespective of whether the property is
observed or not. The theory does not need, and hence
makes no provision to account for the Observer’s con-
sciousness.
Quantum mechanics also predicts correlations between
two or more observations made on a quantum system.
Its basic rules were given in [8], and we briefly review
them here in a slightly tailored version (for more detail
see [12]) If L quantities Q`, ` = 1, 2, ..., L are measured
at different times t = tl, one looks for a probabilities
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2P (QLiL ← QL−1iL−1 .... ← Q1i1) to obtains a series of out-
comes Q`i` . Each quantity is represented by a Hermitian
operator
ˆˆ
Q` =
∑N
i`=1 |q`i`〉Q`i`〈q`i` |, where N is dimension
of the system’s Hilbert space . A virtual (Feynman) path
{qLnL ...← q2n2 ← q1n1}, connecting the eigenstates |q`i`〉, is
endowed with a probability amplitude
A(qLnL ...← q2n2 ← q1n1) = 〈qLnL |Uˆ(tL, tL−1)|qL−1nL−1〉 ×(1)
...〈q3n3 |Uˆ(t3, t2)|q2n2〉〈q2n2 |Uˆ(t2, t1)|q1n1〉,
where Uˆ(t′, t) is the system’s evolution operator. Initial
measurement (preparation) must define the initial state
|q1i1〉 unambiguously, Q1i1 ↔ |q`i`〉. An amplitude for the
observed sequence (real path) QLiL ← QL−1iL−1 .... ← Q1i1 is
obtained by by adding the amplitudes (1) according to
the degeneracies of the eigenvalues Q`i` , ` = 1, 2, ...L−1 (
virtual paths ending in different final states do not inter-
fere [8]). This yields a “sum over paths” type equation
A(qLnL ...← Q`i` ...← Q1i1) =
N∑
n2,n3,...,nL−1=1
L−1∏
`=2
(2)
∆
(
Q`i` − 〈q`n` |Qˆ`|q`n`〉
)
A(qLnL ← qL−1nL−1 ...← q1i1),
where ∆(x−y) = 1 if x = y, and 0 otherwise, account for
the observed outcomes. The desired probability is found
by taking the absolute square of the amplitudes,
P (QLiL ← QL−1iL−1 ....← Q1i1) = (3)
N∑
nL=1
∆
(
QLiL − 〈qLnL |QˆL|qLnL〉
)
|A(qLnL ← QL−1iL−1 ...← Q1i1)|2,
Note that the eigenstates |q`iL〉 are determined by the
measurements the Observer is planning to make, and not
by the actual state of the evolving system. The proba-
bility in Eq.(3) refers to the entire series of the planned
observations [8], and does not refer explicitly to the col-
lapse of the wave function.
Unlike the classical theory, quantum mechanics makes
only statistical predictions for a real path QLiL ←
QL−1iL−1 .... ← Q1i1 . (One exception is the choice QˆL =
Uˆ(t`, t1)Qˆ
`Uˆ−1(t`, t1), in which case an outcome, corre-
sponding to the eigenvalue Qˆ`i` may be obtained with cer-
tainty [13]). Also, adding intermediate observations may
destroy the interference between the Feynman paths in
Eq.(2), and different choices of measurements lead to es-
sentially different statistical ensembles [13].
Classical mechanics usually makes no claims about living
matter [10]. In the original Wigner’s Friend scenario [3],
Observer’s consciousness is itself a subject of quantum
mechanical description [14]. Making it such a subject,
however, is likely to lead to contradictions as we now
discuss.
B. A WIGNER, HIS FRIEND AND A SPIN
Anticipating on Wigner’s Friend scenario, to be intro-
duced below, let us consider a system consisting of a spin-
1/2, and two probes, one for the “Friend” (F), and one
for the other observer (W). The probes are two-level sys-
tems, which W and F can access directly, while the spin
itself remains invisible to the naked eye. As described in
the previous Section, their observations amount to mea-
suring projectors
QˆF,W = |1F,W 〉〈1F,W | (4)
with the eigenvalues QF,Wi 0 and 1. That is to say that
F and W may “obtain outcomes” from their respective
probes, and see “yes” (QF,W1 = 1) or “no” (Q
F,W
1 = 0)
answers.
W and F are free to couple their probes to the spin,
and to each other, if desired. The outcome of an initial
preparation ascertains that, at t = t0, the probes and the
spin can be described by a product state
|Φ0〉 = |0W 〉|0F 〉|s0〉. (5)
We recall that the probabilities in Eq.(3) must refer to the
sequences of the outcomes experienced, or registered by
the Observers [2]. Thus, one may ask about the odds on
F seeing a “yes”, and W seeing his “yes” later. Moreover,
F can decide not to register his result. Then, by the
strict rules imposed in the previous Section, one may
only ask about the likelihood of W seeing a “yes”. The
question is whether the rules of Sect. A allow a mere act
of “registering a result” on the part of F can alter W’s
future experiences.
C. BOTH F AND W COUPLE THEIR PROBES
TO THE SPIN
For simplicity, we assume that neither the probes, nor
the spin have their own dynamics, and remain in the same
condition, unless F or W does something to them. Let
F briefly (practically instantaneously) couple his probe a
τF , τF > t0, and then look, or not look, at his result at
t1 > τ
F . The interaction (e.g., application of a CNOT
gate) entangles the spin in an arbitrary given state |s〉
with F’s probe according to
|0F 〉|s〉 → 〈sF1 |s〉|1F 〉|sF1 〉+ 〈sF2 |s〉|0F 〉|sF2 〉, (6)
At τW > t1 Wigner couples his probe to the spin, using
a different spin basis |sWi 〉,
|0W 〉|s〉 → 〈sW1 |s〉|1W 〉|sW1 〉+ 〈sW2 |s〉|0W 〉|sW2 〉. (7)
The experiment is completed when W looks at his probe
at t = t2 > τ
W .
The probability of W seeing a “yes” outcome (eigenvalue
1, the probe state |1W 〉) is P (yesW ). Would P (yesW )
depend on whether F actually registered his result, or
3just turned on the coupling between his probe and the
the spin? In principle it could, since F’s experience be-
longs to the past and, according to the rule of Sect.A,
could destroy interference between virtual paths, leading
to W’s outcome [12]. In practice, it doesn’t since there
is no interference to destroy. The situation is sketched
in Fig.1. There are only four virtual paths with non-
vanishing amplitudes, {m}, m = 1, 2, 3, 4,
A1 ≡ A(1′ ← 1← Φ0) = 〈1′|Uˆ(τW )|1〉〈1|Uˆ(τF )|Φ0〉(8)
A2 ≡ A(2′ ← 1← Φ0) = 〈2′|Uˆ(τW )|1〉〈1|Uˆ(τF )|Φ0〉
A3 ≡ A(3′ ← 2← Φ0) = 〈3′|Uˆ(τW )|2〉〈2|Uˆ(τF )|Φ0〉
A4 ≡ A(4′ ← 2← Φ0) = 〈4′|Uˆ(τW )|2〉〈2|Uˆ(τF )|Φ0〉
where Uˆ(τW ) and Uˆ(τF ) are the evolution operators, cor-
responding to the evolutions (6) and (7), respectively,
and we used a shorthand
|1〉 ≡ |0W 〉|1F 〉|sF1 〉, |2〉 ≡ |0W 〉|0F 〉|sF2 〉, (9)
|1′〉 ≡ |1W 〉|1F 〉|sW1 〉, |2′〉 ≡ |0W 〉|1F 〉|sW2 〉,
|3′〉 ≡ |1W 〉|0F 〉|sW1 〉, |4′〉 ≡ |0W 〉|0F 〉|sW2 〉.
The amplitudes in Eq.(8) can be expressed via the am-
plitudes, defined for the spin, uncoupled to the probes,
A1 = 〈sW1 |sF1 〉〈sF1 |s0〉, A2 = 〈sW2 |sF1 〉〈sF1 |s0〉, (10)
A3 = 〈sW1 |sF2 〉〈sF2 |s0〉, A4 = 〈sW2 |sF2 〉〈sF2 |s0〉,
The paths are shown in Fig.1a and, with both F and W
noW yesW
|1>
|1’>
|2>
|2’> |3’> |4’>
Ti
m
e
|Φ0>t0
t1
t2
τF
τW
noF
Preparation
yesFFriend
Wigner
interaction 1
interaction 2
{1} {2} {4}{3}
a) b)
FIG. 1. a) Virtual paths in case F and W measure the spin.
Interactions (6) and (7) at τF and τW determine the evolution
operators in Eq.(1). F and W register their outcomes at t1 and
t2, respectively. The corresponding operators Qˆ
` in Eq.(2)
are the projectors (4). b) Sequences of observed events (real
paths) in case both F and W decide to register outcomes.
W’s probabilities do not depend on F’s decision to register
or not to register, as no interference between virtual paths is
destroyed.
looking at their results (see Fig.1b), we have
P (yesW , yesF ) = |A1|2, P (noW , yesF ) = |A2|2,(11)
P (yesW , noF ) = |A3|2, P (noW , noF ) = |A4|2.
To evaluate W’s probabilities in the case F was not reg-
istering his outcome, we must add amplitudes of all vir-
tual paths, leading to the same final state |i′〉. However,
there is only one virtual path connecting |Φ0〉 with each
of the W’s final states, so there is nothing to add. (Note
that Fig.1a sketches an uninteresting double-slit prob-
lem, where four final positions on the screen, |1′〉, ..|4′〉,
can be reached through one of the slits, |1〉 or |2〉, only.)
Therefore, from (3) we have
P (yesW |F not registering) = |A1|2 + |A3|2 = (12)
P (yesW , yesF ) + P (yesW , noF ) ≡ P (yesW |F registering),
It does not matter whether F has registered his result or
not, provided the probe was coupled to the spin. This
is an expected result, to which we will return to it after
considering first another example.
D. W MEASURES F’S PROBE INSTEAD
Suppose that at t = τW Wigner decides to couple his
probe not the spin, as before, but to his Friend’s probe
instead. For this purpose, he uses a different basis (i =
1, 2)
|φFi 〉 = ui1|1F 〉+ ui0|0F 〉, 〈φFi |φFj 〉 = δij , (13)
and with F’s probe initially in some |ψF 〉 the coupling
produces an entangled state
|0W 〉|ψF 〉 → 〈φF1 |ψF 〉|1W 〉|φF1 〉+ 〈φF2 |ψF 〉|0W 〉|φF2 〉.(14)
The situation is still described by the diagram in Fig.1a,
with the only difference that now
|1′〉 ≡ |1W 〉|φF1 〉|sF1 〉, |2′〉 ≡ |0W 〉|φF2 〉|sF1 〉, (15)
|3′〉 ≡ |1W 〉|φF1 〉|sF2 〉, |4′〉 ≡ |0W 〉|φF2 〉|sF2 〉.
The four possible outcomes are still as shown in Fig.1b,
the probabilities are given by Eq.(12) and, as before, F’s
decision to register or not to register his outcome does
not change the statistics of the results experienced by
W. Next we discuss the reason for that.
E. THE “IN PRINCIPLE” PRINCIPLE. VON
NEUMANN CHAINS
In his lectures [8] Feynman stressed that scenarios
which can be distinguished in principle cannot interfere.
Thus, it should not matter whether a conscious Observer
has actually experienced a particular outcome, as long
as any Observer could experience it, perhaps at a later
time.
In the example of Sect. C, F’s observation finds the spin
in one of its states |sFi 〉, The spin’s condition changes
when W applies his coupling. However, W’s manipula-
tion does not affect F’s probe, which continues to carry
the record of spin’s condition, as it was just after t1.
4Wigner’s Friend may decide to observe his probe later,
or not to register his result at all (see Sect. 3-2 of [8]), and
this is enough to preclude interference. With F’s machine
switched off, the paths {1W 0F sW1 ← 0W 0F sF1 ← Φ0} and
{1W 0F sW1 ← 0W 0F sF2 ← Φ0} would interfere, but with
the machine on, the paths {1W 1F sW1 ← 0W 1F sF1 ← Φ0}
and {1W 0F sW1 ← 0W 0′F sF2 ← Φ0} lead to different final
states, and become exclusive alternatives [8].
Similarly in Sect.D W destroys the state of F’s probe,
but leaves alone the spin itself. Therefore, F can repeat
his measurement using a different probe at a t1 > t2, and
obtain the same result he would have seen if he had both-
ered to look at some t1 < t2. This information is now
encoded in the spin’s, rather than in the probe’s condi-
tion.
In practice, Friend’s states |1F 〉 and |0F 〉 (and similarly
|1W 〉 and |0W 〉) may describe not a single degree of free-
dom, but a sequence of K objects and devices, start-
ing with a simple pointer, coupled to the spin, passing
through an amplifier to Friend’s retina and neurons, and
ending at the elusive boundary, where information about
physical world enters the Observer’s “extra observational
inner life” [2]. With all elements of the chain in agree-
ment, we can write
|0F 〉 =
K∏
k=1
|0Fk 〉, |0F 〉|sF1 〉 =
K∏
k=1
|0Fk 〉|sF1 〉. (16)
and then group the terms in an arbitrary manner. For
example it is possible to redefine |0F 〉 → ∏Kk=n |0Fk 〉 and|sF1 〉 → ∏nk=1 |0Fk 〉|sF1 〉, or even |0F 〉 → ∏nk=m |0Fk 〉 and
|sF1 〉 →
∏m
k=1 |0Fk 〉
∏K
k=n |0Fk 〉|sF1 〉. Wigner is free to cou-
ple his probe to the newly defined |0F 〉 or |sF1 〉 as before,
and with the same result. For as long as a single |0Fk 〉
or |sF1 〉 remains to carry the evidence of what F would
have seen at t = t1, actually seeing it has no effect on
W’s experience. We haven’t however yet discussed the
original Wigner’s argument, and will do it next.
F. THE WIGNER’S FRIEND PROBLEM
In a nutshell, the problem discussed in [3] concerns
the case where W decides to engage the entire composite
F’s probe + spin, so that no material record of what
happened at t1 is carried forward for future reference. In
order to do so he may couple his probe at t = τW thus
entangling it with a composite’s state |ϕ〉
|0W 〉|ϕ〉 → 〈1FS |ϕ〉|1W 〉|1FS〉+ (17)
4∑
i=2
〈iFS |ϕ〉|0W 〉|iFS〉,
using, for example,
|1FS〉 = [|1F 〉|sF1 〉+ |0F 〉|sF2 〉] /√2, (18)
|2FS〉 = [|1F 〉|sF1 〉 − |0F 〉|sF2 〉]/
√
2.
(Two remaining orthogonal basis states, |3FS〉 and |4FS〉,
are not connected by the evolution operators in (1), and
need not be specified.) Two possible final states of the
composite W’s probe + F’s probe + spin, therefore, are
|1′〉 = |1W 〉|1FS〉, and |2′〉 = |0W 〉|2FS〉.es (19)
Now the four virtual paths, shown in Fig.2a, correspond
to a primitive double-slit problem with only two final
positions, |1′〉 and |2′〉, each of which is accessible via
both “slits” |1〉 and |2〉. The corresponding amplitudes
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FIG. 2. a) Virtual paths in case F measures the spin, and
W measures a composite spin + F’s probe. The evolution
operators in Eq.(1) are determined by interactions (6) and
(17), and the operators Qˆ` are still the projectors (4). b)
Real paths in case both F and W look at their probes. c) Real
paths if F decides not to look. According to the rules of Sect.
A, W’s probabilities depend on F’s decision. The “paradox”
disappears if F’s looking leaves a record in his memory, which
adds an extra degree(s) of freedom to W’s calculation.
are given by
A1 = 〈1′|U(τW )|1〉〈1|U(τF )|Φ0〉, (20)
A2 = 〈1′|U(τW )|2〉〈2|U(τF )|Φ0〉,
A3 = 〈2′|U(τW )|1〉〈1|U(τF )|Φ0〉,
A4 = 〈2′|U(τW )|2〉〈2|U(τF )|Φ0〉.
Both interactions (6) and (17) are now in place. The
question is whether F registering his outcome at t = t1
would change the odds on W obtaining his “yes” out-
come at t = t2. Our rules of Sect.A say that it would.
Indeed, with F registering, there are four real observable
outcomes shown in Fig.2b, and
P (yesW |F registering) = |A1|2 + |A2|2 = (21)
P (yesW , yesF ) + P (yesW , noF )
while with F not registering, we have a different result
P (yesW |F not registering) = |A1 +A2|2 = (22)
P (yesW |F registering) + Re[A∗1A2].
This is the result we want to examine, but first we briefly
revisit Wigner’s own argument.
5G. WIGNER’S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Wigner‘s formulation of the dilemma was slightly dif-
ferent. He asked (in our notations) whether just after F
registered his result at t = t1 + 0, W should ascribe to
the composite F’s probe + spin a pure state
|φ〉 = 〈sF1 |s0〉|1F 〉|sF1 〉+ 〈sF2 |s0〉|0F 〉|sF2 〉, (23)
or a statistical mixture
ρˆ = |1F 〉|sF1 〉|〈sF1 |s0〉|2〈sF1 |〈1F |+ (24)
|0F 〉|sF2 〉|〈sF2 |s0〉|2〈sF2 |〈0F |.
This is not the language we used in Sect.A. Feynman’s
rule does not refer directly to the state of the system at
a given time, or to the “collapse of the wave function”
following an observation.
Translated into the language of the previous Section,
Wigner’s choice is between considering the paths {1} and
{2} (as well as {3} and {4}) in Fig.2a as interfering or as
exclusive alternatives. Indeed, if (23) is true, the proba-
bility of W seeing a “yes” is given by
P (yesW ) ≡ tr [|1′〉〈1′| ⊗ ρˆ] = |A1|2 + |A2|2. (25)
If, on the other hand, (24) holds, the same probability
should be
P (yesW ) ≡ |〈1′|φ〉|2 = |A1 +A2|2. (26)
Feynman’s prescription, however, is clear. With both
F and W looking, interference must be destroyed, and
Eq.(24) rather than Eq.(23) must be used. As far as
we know, while discussing distinguishable scenarios [8],
Feynman never specified how they can be distinguished
and by who.
Wigner, for his part, brought this question to the fore,
and made three points . Firstly, a superposition (23)
is allowed for inanimate objects (including macroscopic
ones), but ought to be considered absurd if applied to a
conscious F, thereby forced to remain in a state of “sus-
pended animation” until W asks him what he saw.
Secondly, and because of that, F’s consciousness should
act onto material objects, so that the wave function of
F+F’s probe+spin is turned into a statistical mixture.
Thirdly, in practice, telling the difference between a pure
state and a mixture can be extremely difficult for suffi-
ciently complex systems, such as F and his macroscopic
probe (laboratory).
Now much depends on how F’s consciousness and quan-
tum theory are interrelated. According to London and
Bauer [1], F’s consciousness should be described by a
quantum state, which we could include in the Friend’s
states denoted |0F 〉 or |1F 〉 in Eq. (17). This would
have to destroy the superposition (17) because, by intro-
spection, consciousness knows that a single outcome has
been observed. But standard linear quantum mechan-
ics lacks the means for doing so. In [3] Wigner provides
the necessary means postulating a non-linear evolution
whenever human consciousness is involved. Indeed, if
standard linear QM were to be applied , the composite
F consciousness + F’s probe would be in a superposition
that Wigner asserts “is not credible” [15]. Next we turn
to Ref. [8] for more insight.
H. FEYNMAN’S RULES AND MATERIAL
RECORDS
In our attempt to follow the approach of [8] and Sect.
A, we would need to observe at least the following four
restrictions.
(i) The probabilities in Eq.(3) refer to the impressions,
registered by conscious Observers, (see also [2]).
(ii) Quantum theory, has nothing to say about conscious-
ness itself, or about its interaction with material (i.e.,
inanimate) world.
(iii) Quantum theory, [i.e., Eqs.(1)-(3)], applies to all ma-
terial objects, regardless of their size and complexity.
(iv) (Uncertainty Principle) In the Young’s double-slit
experiment it is impossible to know which slit was chosen
by a particle, while maintaining the interference pattern
on the screen [8].
The second assumption appears to be the most vulnera-
ble, and we are forced at least to speculate about some
properties of Observer’s consciousness and the existence
of material records.
We begin with a contradiction. If a record of a registered
outcome is kept inside F’s “inner world” (which we can
say nothing about), and W manages to entangle with his
probe all objects holding the material records [but not
F’s consciousness (see ii)], we contradict the Uncertainty
Principle (iv). Indeed, W detects the presence of the
interference term in Eq.(21), and yet F knows that the
system has passed through the “slit”, represented by, say,
|1〉 in Fig.2a.
An attempt to remedy this by including F’s inner world
into a quantum mechanical calculation, as suggested by
London and Bauer [1] returns us to the unsavoury notion
of the “state of suspended animation” [3], experienced by
F prior to W’s query.
A possible way out requires making certain minimal as-
sumptions about the existence of material records. The
rules of Sect. A readily account for the discrepancies be-
tween probabilities in Eqs.(21) and (22), if each act in
which an Observer registers his/her result is accompa-
nied by producing a record in the memory, or indeed on
any other material object. Adding the record’s degree(s)
of freedom would change the size of a Hilbert space and
create new virtual and real paths. Thus, two calculations
of Sect. F, one for F registering his result, and the other
for F not doing so, would naturally be different.
Now by (iii) we must assume that the record left in F’s
memory or elsewhere is, in principle, accessible to W’s
manipulations. There is, however, no contradiction. If
all material records could be erased by W’s subsequent
measurement, previous F’s experience would not count
-it could be undone and would never be confirmed- and
6W’s probabilities would be given by Eq.(22). If W’s mea-
surement misses at least one material record left in F’s
memory or in his laboratory, the presence of the cor-
responding orthogonal states will guarantee that Eq.(3)
will yield the probabilities (21). Subsequent observations
on the part of F cannot change this result, since the rules
(2) and (3) are explicitly causal, and forbid the influence
of future measurements on the results already obtained
(see, for example, [12]). In effect, we are able to leave
aside the very act of registering, and concentrate on its
physical consequences. Quantum mechanics only briefly
looses the narrative while the perceived outcome is being
passed to the Observer’s memory, but quickly recovers it
after a tangible material evidence is provided.
Finally, it is worth recalling, that quantum theory can
be used (and is most often used) by a third person, say,
W’s cousin (C), who is reasoning about the joint experi-
ences of F and W, and is not taking part in the actual
experiments herself. Her conclusion must be that the
odds on W seeing a “yes” outcome are given by Eq.(21)
if his measurement preserves some form of F’s record, and
by Eq.(22) if W completely destroys it. Personalities do
not matter, and in C’s mind particular F and W can
be replaced by any pair of two human Observers, which
may or may not communicate with each other during the
course of the experiment.
I. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Quantum theory is ”invented” (in the words of Wigner
[3]) by human consciousness for dealing with material
physical phenomena and, from the start, we do not ex-
pect it to be a suitable judge of the consciousness it-
self [16]. For this to be true one needs to show that
the theory remains internally consistent, if restricted to
physical phenomena only. This idea arises already in
classical physics [10], and is exacerbated in the quan-
tum case, where the theory predicts essentially different
statistical ensembles, with and without the presence of
an intermediate Observers. Wigner’s radical answer to
this conundrum [3] was to bring the Observer’s conscious-
ness into the theory’s remit in another way, by modify-
ing the standard (linear) quantum mechanical evolution.
One may reasonably wonder whether the problem can be
treated without such a dramatic departure from conven-
tional quantum theory
With this in mind, we have argued that Feynman’s rules,
as given in [8], allow one to leave conscious Observers
outside the theory’s scope, on a condition that all infor-
mation about the outcomes of the observations made be
contained in material records, themselves subject to a
quantum analysis. Certain, albeit minimal, assumptions
about the Observer’s behaviour are, therefore, necessary.
In particular, whenever asked about the outcome of an
experiment, the Observer would need to consult the rel-
evant record, and cannot simply be ”aware of it” at all
times. Such a record can be kept as a note on a piece
of paper, a file on a microchip, or in the Observer’s own
memory.
The rules of Sect.A automatically account for the exis-
tence of such a record, by including the corresponding
degree of freedom into a quantum mechanical calcula-
tion. Virtual paths, previously leading to the same final
state, are thus modified to lead to distinguishable out-
comes. This is sufficient for destroying the interference
present if a Hilbert space of a smaller dimension is used,
as happens, for example, in Fig.1.
A record can be destroyed, e.g., by subsequent measure-
ments, as happens in Fig.2. Although some records, e.g.,
macroscopic ones may be more robust, all information
can be destroyed in this manner in principle, if not in
practice. With all records destroyed, one must conclude
that the information about the outcome of a particular
experiment is irretrievably lost, in a stronger sense than
in the classical case. It was argued by Feynman and Hi-
bbs [17], by design a measurement apparatus yields a
stable record in situations in which, through the statis-
tical mechanics of amplification, the amplitudes play no
more role. In [8] Feynman argues also that even if a pho-
ton, scattered each time an electron passes through the
first slit of the Young’s experiment, is never observed,
the interference pattern will be destroyed. In both cases
we deal with records robust in the sense that in prac-
tice they will never be engaged by the participants of
the experiment, which one would take into account while
evaluating the probabilities of the outcomes.
Finally, allowing the Observer to keep information about
his/her perceived outcomes in a domain beyond the reach
of quantum theory would lead to a conflict with the Un-
certainty Principle. Indeed, in Fig.2 the Principle de-
mands that the outcome of F’s measurement remain in-
determinate, since the paths {1} and {3} ({2} and {4})
interfere. Friend’s awareness of his result would, in this
case, amount to knowing the slit, chosen by an electron
in the Young’s double-slit experiment and maintaing the
interference pattern on the screen. Given the Principle’s
crucial role in ”protecting” quantum mechanics from a
logical collapse, [8], avoiding such conflict should be a
necessary requirement for any analysis of the Wigner’s
Friend problem.
Acknowledgements
Financial support of MCIU, through the grant PGC2018-
101355-B-100(MCIU/AEI/FEDER,UE) and the Basque
Government Grant No IT986-16. is acknowledged by DS.
[1] LONDON F., and BAUER E., La the´orie de l’observation
en me´canique quantique in Expose´s de Physique Ge´ne´rale
III 1(1939). English translation in J. A Wheeler and
7W. H. Zurek (Eds) Quantum Theory and Measurement
(Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), p. 217.
[2] VON NEUMANN J., Mathematical Foundations of
Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, 1955), pp. 183-217, Chap. VI.
[3] WIGNER E. P., Remarks on the mind-body question, in
The Scientist Speculates, edited byI. J. Good, (London,
Heinemann, 1961).
[4] FRAUCHIGER D. and RENNER, R., Nat. Comm.
— (2018)9:3711 — DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-05739-8 —
www.nature.com/naturecommunications.
[5] SUDBURY A., Single-World Theory of the Extended
Wigner’s Friend Experiment, Found Phys 47, 658 (2017).
[6] LAZAROVICI D. and HUBERT M., How Quantum Me-
chanics can consistently describe the use of itself. Sci.
Rep. (2019) 9:470 — DOI:10.1038/s41598-018-37535-1.
[7] BRUKNER C., A No-Go Theorem for Observer-
Independent Facts, Entropy 20, 350 (2018).
[8] FEYNMAN R.P. and LEIGHTON R., and SANDS M.,
The Feynman Lectures on Physics III (Dover Publica-
tions, Inc., New York, 1989), Ch.1: Quantum Behavior.
[9] BOHR N., Wirkungsquantum ind Naturbeschreibung,
Naturwiss, 17, 483 (1929).
[10] HERTZ H., The principles of mechanics, (Wentworth
Press, 2016).
[11] MATZKIN A., Realism and the wave function, Eur. J .
Phys. 23, 285 (2002).
[12] SOKOLOVSKI D., A minimalist’s view of quantum me-
chanics, Euro. Phys. Lett., 128, 50001 (2019); quant-ph
2005.12674.
[13] SOKOLOVSKI D., Path probabilities for consecutive
measurements, and certain ”quantum paradoxes” Ann.
Phys., 397, (2018) 474.
[14] WIGNER E.P:, in E. P. Wigner, Symmetries and Reflec-
tions (Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington, 1967), p. 185-
199.
[15] WIGNER E.P., Epistemology of quantum mechanics,
Contemporary Physics Vol. 2 (Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, Vienna, 1969), p. 431-437.
[16] ACACIO de BARROS J., and OAS G., Can we falsify
the consciousness-causes-collapse hypothesis in quantum
mechanics?, Found. Phys. 47 1294 (2017).
[17] FEYNMAN R.P. and HIBBS A.R., Quantum Mechanics
and Path Integrals (McGraw-Hill, 1965).
